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Loving v. Virginia' has been thought of in many ways: as an im-
portant step toward full equality for African-Americans,2 as, more
generally, a statement about the suspect classification of race,3 as a
declaration about the fundamental nature of marriage,4 and as a criti-
cal addition to the construction of the right to privacy 5 (as well as, of
course, exemplified in the validation of the Lovings' own marriage).6
t With apologies to Bilbo Baggins of J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE HOBBIT OR THERE AND BACK
AGAIN (1982).
* Fritz Duda Family Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY AND
ADOPTION (2003). The whole idea of Professor Kennedy is that allowing marriage and adoption
rights are the final legal step toward full equality.
3. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), (striking
down a Florida criminal statute which proscribed and punished habitual cohabitation only if one
of an unmarried couple was white and the other black); cf. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187
(Minn. 1971) (making the point that Loving was about race and should not be read to extend
marriage to same-sex couples); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) ("This is not
the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving; the statute there,
prohibiting black and white people from marrying each other, was in substance anti-black legis-
lation."); Anderson v. King, 138 P.3d 983, 989 (Wash. 2006) ("In Loving the Court determined
that the purpose of the antimiscegenation statute was racial discrimination, and the fact of equal
application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the
Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race. The
[Loving] Court also said that the Lovings [sic] fundamental freedom of choice to marry may not
be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.").
4. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("Although Loving arose in the context of
racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals."); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("Marriage is
one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."); Good-
ridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003) ("It is undoubtedly for these
concrete reasons, as well as for its intimately personal significance, that civil marriage has long
been termed a 'civil right."').
5. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 & n.7 (1972).
6. Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal Narra-
tive of Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229 (1998).
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In my contribution to the first Loving symposium,7 I wrote about
the increasing tendency of the Supreme Court, following the 1967 de-
cision, to treat the rights of intimacy as belonging to the individual
adults involved.8 I concluded that the Court increasingly "vindicate[d]
the choices and inclination of adults," viewing marriage as depending
upon continuing emotional fulfillment and neglecting the "perma-
nence, commitment, and unconditional nurturing of marriage and
parenthood."9
Recently, however, I have been wondering whether the Court
might not have reached the end of this trajectory and returned to cele-
brating the intimate relationships as opposed to the rights, particularly
reinforcing relationships between parent and child. Many of my mus-
ings, though reached independently, echo those expressed in Carl
Schneider's Religion and Child Custody,a° and my worries about them
in Mary Ann Glendon's Rights Talk.1 Nonetheless, I do realize that
the two emphases may be operating simultaneously,12 and when the
7. Margaret F. Brinig, The Supreme Court's Impact on Marriage 1967-90, 41 How. L.J. 271
(1998).
8. Id. at 272.
9. Id. at 287.
10. Carl Schneider, Religion and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879 (1992).
11. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
14 (1991) ("Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens so-
cial conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least
the discovery of common ground."); see MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHIL-
DREN'S RIGHTS 42 (2005) (The children's rights movement allowed children's interests to be
considered apart from their parents' rights and interests and perhaps as opposed to them. Chil-
dren are not and ought not be, fully autonomous human beings. Yet the emphasis on rights has
resulted in dividing children from their parents, while "[t]he immutable truth of childrearing is
that someone has to be in charge"); Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitar-
ianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BYU L. REV. 605
(1976) (suggesting in the context of a search and seizure case that advancing the child's fourth
amendment rights curtailed the parent's ability to discipline the child or maintain a crime free
home).
12. See Merry Jean Chan, The Authorial Parent: An Intellectual Property Model of Parental
Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1218-1219 (2003) (parents possess the equivalent of the rights of
authors in their interest in passing along both genetic and cultural attributes in children); David
D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of Best Interests Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857,
874 (2005) (discussing that "best interest" statutes are constitutional because both parents and
children possess rights); Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children's Welfare, 11 Wm.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1072 (2003) (parents need authority to best raise children). At least
some of the cases may also be seen as describing the terrain of modern fathers' rights jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Gloria Chan, Reconceptualizing Fatherhood: The Stakes Involved in Newdow, 28
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 467, 472 (2005) (discussing standing in terms of father's rights); Nancy E.
Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J.
1271, 1277, 1304 (2005) (discussing Newdow and Michael H.); Adrien Katherine Wing & Laura
Weselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of Mothering: The Need for Critical Race Feminist
Praxis, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 257, 258 (1999) (arguing that "there is a critical need to value
the mothering work of those who are not biological mothers and therefore not traditionally
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interests of parent and child collide, a majority of the Court has re-
cently concluded that the child's interests may prevail.t3
If I am right that Loving begins a cycle of sorts, a profitable way
of thinking about the case might then be (to paraphrase the book of
Genesis14 ) that Loving begat Michael H., 15 Michael H. begat Troxel,
16
and so forth. Furthermore, in the same way that Meyer1 7 and Pierce1 8
seem rather strange ancestors to Roe v. Wade,19 Loving (also cited in
Roe),2" clearly a case about marriage, seems a strange predecessor for
cases dealing with children's interests when they diverge from their
parents' interests. Nevertheless, because the constitutional right of
privacy expanded in Loving2 is closely connected with the prudential
family law notion of autonomy,22 the connection between such cases
makes sense.
With these musings in mind, I would like to consider five recent
Supreme Court cases involving relationships, 23 and in particular, the
supported in the role.... [1]f we do not expand the definition to include non-traditional mothers
- men, lesbians, poor women, and women of color - we deny ourselves the chance to benefit
from the mothering they can provide our children.").
13. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 2 (2004) (Stevens, J., with Ken-
nedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, J.J., joining). See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
14. See generally Genesis 25:19 (King James) (using "begat" to describe family lineage).
15. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
16. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
17. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state may not forbid a teacher from teaching
modern languages).
18. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state may not require that students attend
public, as opposed to parochial or private, schools).
19. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (stating that a state may not forbid elective abortion of
mature woman during the first trimester) (citing Meyer and Pierce in the chain of cases establish-
ing a right to privacy).
20. Id. at 152.
21. There are literally hundreds of journal articles concerning privacy. One recent compar-
ative piece that mentions many others in a helpful way is James Q. Whitman, The Two Western
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004) (arguing that the differ-
ence between continental European and American sensibilities grows out of a difference be-
tween privacy as an aspect of dignity (the European) and privacy as an aspect of liberty (the
American)).
22. See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 888 (Ala. 1958) (involving a dispute be-
tween married parents over child's parochial or public school education in which court decides
that "[iut seems to us, if we should hold that equity has jurisdiction in this case such holding will
open wide the gates for settlement in equity of all sorts and varieties of intimate family disputes
concerning the upbringing of children"). See generally Schneider, supra note 10 (arguing that
families, rather than courts, are much better to handle the myriad of disputes that may occur).
23. These are disparate cases, involving third party involvement with nuclear families, the
establishment clause, private adult sexual conduct, and denial of standing to a noncustodial fa-
ther in a challenge to the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Nancy Dowd carries
out a similar analysis in her recent papers on the treatment of fathers. Dowd, supra note 12 , at
1330 (arguing that instead of focusing on biology and then nurture in deciding what rights should
be accorded to fathers, it would be preferable to focus on the nurturing conduct).
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growing acceptance of Justice Stevens's position that children's inter-
ests, and especially their relationships with their parents, ought to be
considered. I begin with Michael H. v. Gerald D.,24 a post-Loving
case about parenting where a marriage relationship was deemed
highly important, but the child's interests were considered only as a
subset of her parents' interests. This is the case with which my origi-
nal Loving piece ended.25
In this case, Gerald D., "a top executive in a French oil com-
pany," married Carole D., "an international model," in 1976. In 1978,
Carole became involved in an adulterous affair with a neighbor,
Michael H., and she had a child, Victoria D., in 1981. Gerald was
listed as the child's father on the birth certificate and always held Vic-
toria out to the world as his daughter. However, a blood test soon
revealed a 98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria's father.
During the next three years, Victoria stayed with Carole, but Carole
moved among the households of Gerald, Michael, and yet another
man, Scott K. It is hard to tell just how much contact Michael had
with Victoria during this period, but it appears that Michael spent
three months with Carole and Victoria in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands
and stayed with Carole and Victoria whenever he was in Los Angeles.
In addition, it also appears that Victoria called Michael "Daddy,
26
Michael contributed to Victoria's support, and Michael was eager to
continue his relationship with her. 7
So eager was Michael that he filed a filiation action to establish
his paternity and win visitation rights.28 In June 1984, however, Car-
ole reconciled with Gerald and joined him in New York, where they
lived with Victoria and two other children born into the marriage.
During this time, Michael's suit encountered a California statute pro-
viding that the child of a wife cohabiting with a husband who is not
impotent or sterile was conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage. Oddly, this conclusive presumption could be rebutted, but
only if the husband or wife made a motion for paternity tests within
24. 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see Dowd, supra note 12, at 1304, 1306 (discussing Michael H. and
noting that "most tellingly, in two cases (Michael H. and Quilloin) the Court ignored the wishes
of the child to maintain a relationship with the biological father" and arguing that the Court's
cases reflect a definition of fatherhood that operates along axes of marriage, biology, legitimiza-
tion, and nurture); Meyer, supra note 12, at 873.
25. Brinig, supra note 7 at 286 & n.97 (mentioning that "the Court neglects the way that
children diminish adult autonomy in marriage" and citing other commentary).
26. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 144.
27. Id. at 113-14.
28. Id. at 114.
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two years of the child's birth.29 In its ruling, the Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of this presumption against Michael's Four-
teenth Amendment challenge.3 ° The Court held that presumptions of
paternity rest upon "the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not
be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that
develop within the unitary family."31 In doing so, the Court quotes
Moore v. East Cleveland,32 noting how deeply the family is rooted in
the nation's "history and tradition.
33
In addition, the Court considered Victoria's interest, but found it
weaker than Michael's:
We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a
liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining
her filial relationship. We need not do so here because, even assum-
ing that such a right exists, Victoria's claim must fail. Victoria's due
process challenge is, if anything, weaker than Michael's.
34
Why would it be weaker? Presumably because her interests
were, at least in theory, protected by the idea that the parents would
be looking out for her best interests, according to Parham v. J.R.,3
and by the California presumption, which relieved the Court from
having to decide who her father was if neither spouse asked.36 As the
Court noted, however, Victoria was not trying to assert her rights
here, so there was no existing conflict between parent and child.
Another case, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet,37 does not seem to consider the children's indepen-
29. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West 1989).
30. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983)).
31. Id.
32. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (involving an extended family threatened by an
exclusionary single family zoning ordinance); see also Brinig, supra note 7, at 281-82.
33. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
34. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130.
35. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."). The case involved
a challenge to a Georgia statute permitting parents to "voluntarily" commit their children to
inpatient mental institutions. The Court upheld the statute, finding that the procedures in ques-
tion, including an independent fact finding by the admitting physician, satisfied the child's inter-
ests in freedom from unnecessary institutionalization.
36. That is, if the Court was not being asked to make the determination, there would be no
need for litigation, which would exacerbate family conflict.
37. 512 U.S. 687 (1994). See generally Avigaell N. Cymrot, Reading, Writing, and Radical-
ism: The Limits on Government Control Over Private Schooling in an Age of Terrorism, 37 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 607 (2006) (arguing that the government should not restrict free exchange in Is-
2007]
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dent interests at all." In this case, suit was brought by taxpayers and
others who sought to invalidate special New York legislation creating
a school district for a religious enclave of strict Jewish practitioners.39
Justice Souter, for the Court, declared that the special legislation vio-
lated the Establishment Clause because of its "purposeful. . . fusion of
governmental and religious functions."4 ° Justice Stevens, in his con-
curring opinion, focused on the statute's effect on children. At this
time, Justice Stevens was still writing for a minority of the Court.4 He
maintained in his concurrence:
The isolation of these children, while it may protect them from
'panic, fear and trauma,' also unquestionably increased the likeli-
hood that they would remain within the fold, faithful adherents of
their parents' religious faith. By creating a school district that is
specifically intended to shield children from contact with others who
have 'different ways,' the State provided official support to cement
the attachment of young adherents to a particular faith.42
lamic private schools, but might restrict Saudi Arabia, say, from funding them. Also. through
selective conditional funding, the government can exert greater control over private schools).
As Cymrot notes, Michael McConnell, now a judge on the 10th Circuit, has written, "[t]he
moral-cultural role of primary and secondary schools today closely resembles that of churches at
the time of the founding" since "it is the schools to which society looks as the principal instru-
ments for inculcation of public virtue-for solutions to problems such as drug use, racism, poor
self-esteem, imprudent sexual conduct, and the like." Id. at 659 (quoting Michael W. McCon-
nell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does Our Constitutional
Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 123, 134 (1991)).
38. Indeed, the commentary focuses upon secularization and the separation of church and
state. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel
School District v. Grumet, 44 EMOizY L.J. 433 (1995); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two
Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of
Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 104 (1996).
39. While the Satmar Jewish schools originally began as private sectarian education only,
which would not have been problematic after Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), they
sought the right to run an independent district in order to allow disabled students to have the
benefits of special educational services unavailable in the private schools.
40. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 702.
41. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring, with Blackmun and Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
42. Id. My point is that Stevens's opinion looks at the effect the separate school district
might have on the ability of children to meaningfully participate in wider American society. See
also Schneider, supra note 10, at 893 ("living as separately from the world as John Edward
Quiner was expected to do might well, as the trial court noted, limit his chances of prospering in
the world, and could actively reduce his happiness."). To this extent Schneider agrees with Jus-
tice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241, 245-46 (1972) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting in part).
I agree with the Court that the religious scruples of the Amish are opposed to the
education of their children beyond the grade schools, yet I disagree with the Court's
conclusion that the matter is within the dispensation of parents alone. The Court's
analysis assumes that the only interests at stake in the case are those of the Amish
parents on the one hand, and those of the State on the other. The difficulty with this
approach is that, despite the Court's claim, the parents are seeking to vindicate not only
their own free exercise claims, but also those of their high-school-age children. ...
[VOL. 51:1
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Carl Schneider discusses this problem of isolation at some length
in Religion and Child Custody.4 3 He recognizes the difficulty of
courts, as opposed to parents, making this sort of decision without
running afoul of the Establishment Clause, and therefore argues for a
hands-off approach unless, in a custody case, the child's best interests
are directly threatened. 4
Justice Stevens's concern for children's relationship rights as dis-
tinct from their parents'4 5 emerges yet more clearly in Troxel v.
Glanville,a6 where the Court upheld a fit parent's constitutional right
It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today's
decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the
child will be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that
we have today. The child may decide that that is the preferred course, or he may rebel.
It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full
meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be
masters of their own destiny. If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in
authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and
deformed. The child, therefore, should be given an opportunity to be heard before the
State gives the exemption which we honor today.
Id. For a more recent case, decided in favor of the mother with extreme religious views, see
Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); see also Schneider, supra note 10,
at 886 (arguing that the doctrine promotes pluralism).
43. Schneider, supra note 10.
44. Id. at 904 ("More important, I have tried to suggest a number of reasons we might
doubt that judicial attempts to mediate those conflicts will be successful and might suspect that
they will be harmful.").
45. Both Yoder and Kiryas Joel involved children of separatist religious sects, and were not
custody and visitation cases. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205: Grumet, 512 U.S. at 711.
46. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). See generally Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among
Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 27, 40 (2004) (arguing for recognition of
children's rights only in those contexts in which children self-initiate); Chan, The Authorial Par-
ent, supra note 12, at 1189, 1213 (2003).
To stimulate childbearing and childrearing that achieves these results, parental rights -
the duration and scope of which may be malleable - to direct the upbringing of a child
are recognized in those who do the work of producing new citizens ... [while] [t]hese
parental rights are recognized as an incentive for the work of parenting, which society
values and wishes to encourage in a certain measure.
Id.; John C. Duncan, Jr., The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from Parental Reinforce-
ment: The Journey to Family Integrity, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1240, 1290-98 (2005) (proposing a Family
Integrity Act); John Dewitt Gregory, The Detritus of Troxel, 40 FAM. L.Q. 133, 133-35, 144
(2006) (discussing state court statutes and cases and arguing that the case has wrought no large
scale changes); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 141-42 (2006) (noting
that the Court in Troxel itself did not subject the visitation law to strict scrutiny, suggesting
accommodation in the future); Michelle Ognibene, A Constitutional Analysis of Grandparents'
Custody Rights, 72 U. CHi. L. REV. 1473, 1480 (2005) (arguing that grandparents should have
constitutional preference over unrelated third parties, and should be able to intervene in adop-
tions once parents are out of the picture.); Cynthia Starnes, Swords in the Hands of Babes: Re-
thinking Custody Interviews after Troxel, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 115, 117-18 (2003) (arguing that the
push for in camera child preference interviews may become stronger post-Troxel, but that it
poses process risks for children); Carol Weisbrod, Painter v. Bannister: Still, 2006 UTAH L. REV.




to determine whether, and under what conditions, visitation by third
parties (in this case grandparents) was appropriate. Broadly speaking,
the case reaffirms the right of fit parents "to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children. 47 Justice Stevens, in his dissent,48
stressed that the broad parental rights articulated by the majority
might not always concur with what was best for their children:
49
[W]e have never held that the parent's liberty interest in this rela-
tionship is so inflexible as to establish a rigid constitutional shield,
protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge ab-
sent a threshold finding of harm. The presumption that parental
decisions generally serve the best interests of their children is sound,
and clearly in the normal case the parent's interest is paramount.
But even a fit parent is capable of treating a child like a mere pos-
session. Cases like this do not present a bipolar struggle between
the parents and the State over who has final authority to determine
what is in a child's best interests. There is at a minimum a third
individual, whose interests are implicated in every case to which the
statute applies - the child.5°
Justice Stevens's point is so central to this piece that I set it out at
some length:
47. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. ("In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.").
Scott, supra note 12, at 1072, makes the point that as parents obtain more rights vis 6 vis the state
and non-parents, they will better serve their children's interests.
48. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting with Scalia, and Kennedy, J.J.).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 86. One question raised by cases since Troxel is whether, for example, divorcing
parents who are litigating custody do have their children's best interests at heart. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2003) (invalidating a third party visitation stat-
ute and holding that the state could not allow interference with parents' decision not to permit
grandparent visitation merely because they were divorcing).
We intimated in Sani that divorce was a circumstance that can cause a breakdown of
the decision-making of parents. However, this was not to suggest that divorce alone
establishes a compelling interest of the state to warrant intrusion into a parent's deci-
sion to deny or limit visitation. We only indicated that divorce, more than the reasona-
bleness of a particular decision to deny visitation, generates the type of concerns that
can justify state interference.
Id. at 189. Once the court determines that there must be a threshold of unfitness before visita-
tion can be granted over parental objection, it goes on to hold,
[i]t is parental fitness that gives rise to the presumption, not mere marital status. Di-
vorce does not diminish the parent's fundamental interest in parenting and does not
make them less capable parents. Thus, the divorce requirement under section 598.35(1)
does not eliminate the need for the parents to be granted the presumption of fitness.
Id. at 192. As Ralph D. Mawdsley, Noncustodial Parents' Right to Direct the Education of Their
Children, 199 W. EDUC. L. REP. 545, 565 (2005) states, "Such competing demands made on
school administrators suggest that they may become (as in Newdow) parties to litigation that is,
in reality, a continuation of the domestic dispute that led to the divorce to the first place" (citing
Wright v. Wright, 1999 WL 674306 (Mass. 1999)).
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While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of
a child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-
like bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent par-
ents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving
such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests,
and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation. At a
minimum, our prior cases recognizing that children are, generally
speaking, constitutionally protected actors require that this Court
reject any suggestion that when it comes to parental rights, children
are so much chattel. The constitutional protection against arbitrary
state interference with parental rights should not be extended to
prevent the States from protecting children against the arbitrary ex-
ercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an inter-
est in the welfare of the child. 5 1
Justice Stevens's opinion in Troxel nevertheless begs the question
of how the child's relationship interests mesh with their strong inter-
ests in being part of a family sufficiently powerful (as against the state
and third parties) to be a place where parents can do their jobs and
children flourish.52 I have made this argument before.53 And of
course Justice Stevens's position was taken in dissent. The majority
extended privacy doctrines to protect the decisions of the parent.54
51. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88-89 (mentioning Michael H.).
52. For an intriguing suggestion that the family may become more powerful by doing some
advance planning, see Linda C. McClain, Family Constitutions and the (New) Constitution of the
Family, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 841-42 (2006), suggesting both family constitutions and mis-
sion statements to replace a "family-hostile" society. McClain suggests that drafting one of these
documents creates a "we" or "interdependent will or social will" for the family since families do
carry a vital role in "the formative project ... [of] social reproduction." Id. at 845, 869-880.
53. See Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RuTGERs L.J. 733
(2001).
54. For a careful discussion of Troxel, see, e.g., Meyer, supra note 46, at 141 (maintaining
that the fact that the Court did not use compelling state interest/strict scrutiny analysis suggests
that it might be relaxing the constitutional doctrine protecting their rights); see also id. at 142
("The Justices' obvious desire to leave flexibility in future cases so that the traditional preroga-
tives of parents might be accommodated with the weighty interests in non-traditional, parent-
like relationships suggests that parental rights are not as robust and clearly defined as some state
court decisions assume."). For a critique of child custody interviews that might increasingly be
sought after the decision, see Starnes, supra note 46, at 117-18.
Troxel's reaffirmation of the significance and breadth of parental rights strengthens par-
ents' claim that procedural due process entitles them to access their children's in-cam-
era statements. while such parental access reduces information risks, it greatly
increases already-high process risks for children, and counsels careful attention to the
context and consequences of preference interviews.
Id.; Gregory, supra note 46, at 133-35, 144 (discussing Troxel generally, and concluding that




A fourth case, Lawrence v. Texas,55 invalidated laws against con-
sensual same-sex sodomy. 56 This case could be considered a victory
for strengthening privacy rights because of the Court's reliance upon
search and seizure cases and police interference with intimate con-
duct.57 Although the Court cautions that it is not considering a statute
recognizing the status of same-sex relationships, 58 Lawrence can also
be considered in a broader sense: as involving the degree of a
couple's relationship itself. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
distinguishes between "mere sex" and "relationship" in these words:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put for-
ward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals .... This, as
a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a
court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its bounda-
ries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects.59
Therefore, as Eisenstadt6" brought privacy to the individual re-
garding contraception, 61 Lawrence returns privacy not just to the gay
man involved, but to his relationship with another.62
Finally, we turn to the case that I believe may come full circle,
that is, back to a consideration of children's interests as distinct from
their parents', in consideration of relationship rights. Elk Grove Uni-
fied School District v. Newdow63 may be best remembered as the case
where the Court refused to consider whether "under God" could re-
55. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
56. The statute invalidated was the former TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003).
57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581-82.
58. Id. at 578.
59. Id. at 567.
60. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
61. Id. at 453 ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a ... person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
62. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (The Court noted that the case "does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter.").
63. 542 U.S. 961 (2004). For general commentary on the case, see Mawdsley, supra note 50,
at 545-50 (discussing cases like Newdow and Crowley v. McKinney, 400 F.3d 965, 968-69 (7th Cir.
2005) (holding that the school could refuse to permit non-custodial father on school premises
during school days as well as withhold some correspondence concerning the children)); Meyer,
supra note 12 at 868; Emily Buss, Parental Rights, 88 VA. L. REv. 635, 636 (2002).
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main part of the Pledge of Allegiance.64 In this case, the Court found
that Michael Newdow, who had joint physical custody of his daughter
but not the power to make ultimate decisions when he disagreed with
her mother," lacked standing as a parent to make his claims because a
California Court had awarded the power to make final decisions (or a
veto power) to his ex-partner, Sarah Banning.66 Authored by Justice
Stevens for the Court, the opinion stated:
This case concerns not merely Newdow's interest in inculcating
his child with his views on religion, but also the rights of the child's
mother as a parent generally and under the Superior Court orders
specifically. And most important, it implicates the interests of a
young child who finds herself at the center of a highly public debate
over her custody, the propriety of a widespread national ritual, and
the meaning of our Constitution.
The interests of the affected persons in this case are in many
respects antagonistic. Of course, legal disharmony in family rela-
tions is not uncommon, and in many instances that disharmony
poses no bar to federal-court adjudication of proper federal ques-
tions. What makes this case different is that Newdow's standing de-
rives entirely from his relationship with his daughter, but he lacks
the right to litigate as her next friend. In marked contrast to our
[T]he Constitution should be read to afford strong protection to parents' exercise of
child-rearing authority but considerably weaker protection to any individual's claim to
parental identity. This means that a state has broad authority to identify nontraditional
caregivers as parents, and, if it does so, it must afford their child-rearing decisions the
same strong protection afforded more traditional parental figures.
Id.; see also the pre-Newdow but prescient writing of Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System:
A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 537, 551 ([The family,], especially the nuclear family,
"will determine at least the child's original religious definition.... [Plarental conduct and atti-
tudes have much to do with the strength of the child's attachment to a religious organization.").
64. Some do, however, see it as a family law case. See, e.g., Chan, supra note 12, at 471
("The Newdow opinion perpetuated the social identity of noncustodial fathers as only minimally
involved in their children's lives. This stereotype in turn affects how noncustodial fathers' claims
will be viewed by others, and courts in particular."); Meyer, supra note 12, at 870; Meyer, supra
note 46, at 143 ("As with the blurring of the family law's traditional boundary markers of
parenthood, the Court's desire to balance these opposing values in constitutional doctrine has
led it [to] abandon the relatively bright lines of strict scrutiny for softer and less certain standards
of intermediate scrutiny.").
65. For a discussion of the retreat from joint physical custody, see James G. Dwyer, A Tax-
onomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 845, 911 (2003). Dwyer notes that joint custody became popular in the
first place because "legislators were responding to political pressure from fathers' rights groups,
which sprang up in many places in reaction to a perception that courts were biased against men
in custody decision making. So some of the focus, at least, was on fairness between the adults.
In addition, many judges initially were receptive to the trend in favor of joint custody because it
seemed to make their jobs easier." Id. at 915.
66. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 17-18.
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case law on jus tertii... the interests of this parent and this child are
not parallel and, indeed, are potentially in conflict.6 7
As such, sometimes parents' and children's rights do conflict.
This may even be true in the typical interracial marriage case ever
since Loving, to the extent that interracial marriages are more likely
to dissolve than to remain intact, and divorce is particularly hard on
biracial children.68 The rights of the Lovings and their children clearly
did not conflict, since the family could not live together legitimately in
Virginia without the Court's decision. A parent-child conflict will be
particularly acute in cases where divorcing parents hold strong - and
potentially opposing - religious beliefs, as was the case in Newdow.6 9
In fact, I have found in a study of Iowa divorces, that there was a
statistically significant relationship between parents who decided re-
ligion was important enough to mention in their separation agree-
ments, 70 and those who divorced on fault grounds and who continued
disputing after the divorce decree.7'
Fights about visitation often center on religion itself or discipli-
nary views strongly colored by religious views. For example, in Baker
v. Baker,72 the mother was Baptist and the father was a Jehovah's Wit-
67. Id. at 15 (citations omitted). See also Dwyer, supra note 65, at 846; Meyer. supra note
12, at 874 ("The social consensus that undergirds parental rights is based partly on the assump-
tion that they work to the benefit of children, but partly also on a sense of justice and desert for
adults."); Meyer argues that the complexities led the Troxel and Lawrence Courts to apply a
lesser standard than strict scrutiny. Meyer, supra note 12, at 877. David D. Myers, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1461, 1465-66 (2006). (parents are
not constitutionally entitled to co-equal role in raising their children following divorce partly
because "the Constitution must be understood to leave room for sensitive accommodation by
the state of the potentially conflicting interests of various family members.) Meyer quotes from
a Virginia court's observation that "[c]ustody and visitation disputes between two fit parents
involve one parent's fundamental right pitted against the other parent's fundamental right. The
discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test... reflects a finely balanced judicial
response to this parental deadlock." Id. at 1479 (quoting Griffin v. Griffin, 581 S.E.2d 899, 902
(Va. Ct. App. 2003)). See generally Scott, supra note 12, at 1083.
68. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Child's Best Interests: A Neglected Perspective on Interracial
Intimacies, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2129, 2150-58 (2004).
69. See Schneider, supra note 10, at 888-89 ("[T]he now hostile relations of the parents
make us doubt some of the reasons we ordinarily have for not intervening in an intact family.").
See also, Newdow, 542 U.S. at 15.
70. Margaret F. Brinig, Unhappy Contracts: The Case of Divorce Settlements, 1 REV. L. &
ECON. 241, 252, 255-56 (2005) (mention of religious education of children in the parents' settle-
ment agreement predicts the presence of a mention of fault grounds in their divorce action in
Iowa, a state where fault is legally irrelevant).
71. Id. at 259 (mention of children's religious education in the parents' settlement agree-
ment significantly related to number of post-divorce litigation).
72. No. 03A01-9704-GS-00115, 1997 WL 731939, *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997); see also
Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607-08 (Mass. 1981); Lundeen v. Struminger, 165 S.E.2d 285
(Va. 1969); Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (transfer of child from
mother, a strict believer in the isolationist Exclusive Brethren sect, to father, who was much less
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ness. The court originally awarded the mother custody. Both parents
were taking the children to their respective religious services and
training and attempting to undermine the religion of the other. At
trial, the mother petitioned for, and won, affirmation of her exclusive
right to determine the children's religious upbringing, based on the
physical and psychological effects the conflict was having on the chil-
dren. In another visitation case, Brown v. Szakal,7 3 the court refused
to order the non-Jewish father to observe the Sabbath and keep ko-
sher when he visited his seven- and nine-year-old daughters. The
court found that "absent a showing of emotional or physical harm to
the children, courts.., will not impose upon the non-custodial parent
the burden of policing the religious instructions of the custodial par-
ent."7 4 A third party visitation case that involved a conflict over disci-
pline (with a belt) is Newman v. Phillips,75 where relationships with
the grandparents were fairly close and cordial until the attempted
discipline.76
I am not one to suggest that the Supreme Court ought to be more
involved with family law than it has been since the substantive due
process days of Meyer 77 and Pierce.7 1 I am also not one to "abandon
children to their 'rights' ,,79 or otherwise suggest that children should
fend for themselves without their parents' help. For me, a childhood
without the nurturing environment of loving parents (or at least one
parent) is dismal. However, I am encouraged that the Court seems to
recognize that in families with children, the children's interests do
need to be considered, and will not always mirror their parents'.8°
strict). For a case refusing to enforce the parent's agreement to raise the child as a Catholic, see
Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956).
73. 514 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986). See also Grayman v. Hession, 84 A.D.2d
111, 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (requirement that Gentile custodial mother send the child to
Hebrew school because she had "either consented to or acquiesced in the religious training the
child has undergone since birth," and had recently moved to Long Island, seriously hindering the
fathers "ability to continue his frequent visitations and religious training of his son."); Mester v.
Mester, 58 Misc. 2d 790 (N.Y. Misc. 1969) (father could not change the visitation or custody
simply to raise the child in the Jewish tradition).
74. Brown, 514 A.2d at 84.
75. No. 03A01-9602-CV-00056, 1996 WL 480856, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
76. Religion and "life style" differences were also central to the dispute between the father
and maternal grandparents in the famous custody case of Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152
(Iowa 1966).
77. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
78. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
79. Hafen, supra note 11, at 607.
80. Compare Schneider, supra note 10, at 906 ("Both the child's parents claim a right to
make decisions for their child. And the children arguably have some kind of a right to assert
their own preferences. Yet, while our vocabulary of rights has ample ways of resolving conflicts
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Thus, my own read of Loving is an aspirational one. I view it as
pointing to relationships to which we should all aspire - good mar-
riages and good parenting - goals the Lovings sought and achieved
for their own family, which included children."s While I would not
return to families hidden under a "veil of privacy '' 82 where parents -
especially fathers - maintained nearly magisterial control over their
children (and wives),83 I do think families need space in which to
thrive. 84 Furthermore, I also believe that parents, especially during a
divorce, too often think of themselves rather than their children.85 As
Jennifer Nedelsky said:
If we ask ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous,
the answer is not isolation, but relationships - with parents, teach-
ers, friends, loved ones - that provide the support and guidance
necessary for the as our tradition teaches, the antithesis of auton-
omy, but a literal precondition of autonomy, and interdependence a
constant component of autonomy.
86
between an individual right-holder and the state, it has no way of resolving such conflicts be-
tween rights holders."), with Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (see
supra text accompanying notes 64-70.).
81. Pratt, supra note 6, at 230.
82. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 459 (1868) ("We will not inflict upon development and
experience of autonomy.... We see that relatedness is not, society the greater evil of raising the
curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence."); see Jana B. Singer,
The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1540-49 (1992).
83. This is the fear of some opponents of Newdow. See, e.g., Gloria Chan, supra note 12,
and some promoters of same-sex marriage, Nancy D. Polikoff. We Will Get What We Ask For:
Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not Dismantle The Legal Structure of Gender in
Every Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
84. See Brinig, supra note 53.
85. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott. Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995)
(arguing that parents are granted autonomy to encourage them to perform their duties faithfully
and putting their children's interests first); see also Schneider, supra note 10, at 899 ("[W]e ac-
cord parents rights because we assume they are the best decision-makers for their own children.
But people in and after a divorce are often wrapped up in a battle with each other, and they may
only too easily lose sight of their children's interests.").
86. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEM. 7, 12 (1989).
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